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Privatisation of stated-owned enterprises (SOEs) gained considerable momentum in developing and 
developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s (The World Bank, 2006, p. 3). Despite wide-ranging 
privatisation programmes, SOEs are still and will be an important part of many economies, especially 
in  developing  economies  (La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  &  Shleifer,  1999;  Ezzamel,  Wilmott,  &  
Worthington, 2008; Vagliasindi, 2008; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013). According to the United Nations, 
SOEs in high-income countries constitute an 8% share of GDP and a 13% share of investments (Ernst 
& Young, 2010). In the least developed countries, the shares are even higher: 14% and 28%, respec-
tively. In China, for example, the central government controls 17,000 SOEs, and local governments 
control over 150,000 SOEs. Furthermore, Indian Railways employs 1.6 million people and is one of 
the world’s largest commercial employers.   
 
State-ownership has been criticised due to undue political interference by governments or to passive 
state ownership (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2005, 28). 
In many places, state-ownership has led to inefficiency and wasted resources compared to private 
ownership in competitive environments (Ramamurti, 1991; Vagliasindi, 2008). It is often stated that 
state-owned enterprises operate behind a curtain, revealing little information beyond their general 
mandate. SOEs’ objectives are unclear or conflicting, and the lack of transparency can also be traced 
to political motivations to avoid public comparisons with the private sector (Ramamurti, 1991; 
OECD, 2005). In some cases, governments may attempt to reduce their budgets and reported deficits 
by pushing spending and debts to their SOEs (Papenfuss & Schaefer, 2009, p. 717-718; Blondy et al., 
2013, p. 270). 
 
On the other hand, through public ownership, the state can sustain sectors of long-term strategic or 
national security interests that are presently uneconomical for private investments. Natural monopo-
lies are perhaps appropriate to keep in public ownership (OECD, 2005; Vihn Le & Buck, 2011). 
Moreover,  governments  often  find  that  SOEs are  a  useful  strategy  to  pursue  social  goals,  such  as  
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greater equality and social stability (Ramamurti, 1987; Bozec & Breton, 2003; Austvik, 2012). How-
ever, state ownership may also be motivated by purely financial objectives (Goldeng, Grünfeld, & 
Benito, 2008; Krivogorsky & Grudnitski, 2010). There is also variation in the ownership shares from 
full, 100% ownership to less-than-10% minority ownership (Liu & Sun, 2005; Lopez-de-Foronda, 
Lopez-Iturriaga, & Santamaria-Mariscal, 2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). When considering these ut-
terly different categories of enterprises, it is crucial to understand what objectives the state-owner 
may set for such enterprises (Luke, 2010).  
 
The purpose of this article is not to discuss corporatisation of government activities or privatisation 
of SOEs but to the heterogeneous field of SOEs. This modelling is performed especially for owner-
ship steering and parliamentary surveillance perspectives.  
The research objective is divided into two questions: 
1. What objectives do SOEs have and how can we classify different SOEs based on these objec-
tives? 
2. How can we form a steering and monitoring model that takes into consideration the different 
objectives and different types of SOEs? This model is then tested with the case country data. 
 
The theoretical concepts have been derived from the agency theory. The practical concepts of SOE 
surveillance and steering are inserted into the theoretical model in a way that allows the formulation 
and implementation of state ownership policies.  By using the Finnish state’s share portfolio as an 
example, we create a framework (or model) that emphasises different ownership policies and steering 
objectives within the heterogeneous SOE context. This framework is crucial to understanding the 
objectives set for different types of ownership and determining the most critical information, espe-
cially from the point-of-view of parliamentary supervision.  The framework is suitable for organising 
and systematising the necessary performance and accountability information of SOEs in developed 
and developing countries, which have a wide variety of SOEs.  
 
The results help form an outline of the issues that are salient in the pursuit of good SOE governance 
and ownership steering. The Finnish data is suitable for this study because, as a Nordic welfare coun-
try, the state of Finland owns a wide variety of different enterprises. Corporate governance of SOEs 





Some of the Finnish state’s enterprise ownership is based purely on financial interests, some is based 
solely on strategic interests and some on strategic and financial interests (Parliament of Finland, 
2009). Moreover, some of these SOEs have corporation charters that make them not-for-profit com-
panies. In addition, the Finnish state shareholdings range from 100% sole ownership to less-than-
10% ownership (see Appendix 1). It should be noted that governments in the UK and other western 
countries have largely divested themselves of such ownership in companies operating on a purely for-
profit basis (Jupe, 2012). Hence, national ownership policies, e.g. in the UK, focus on a much more 
homogenous group of companies than those in Finland and other Nordic countries.  
 
The findings are interesting, especially in the context of transition economies and developing coun-
tries. In these countries, the dimensions of owner steering may, in many respects, be in their infancy, 
and the variety of their SOEs is significant (Koppel, 2007). Consistency in the basis, extent and listing 
status of SOEs as tools for steering and reporting creates good preconditions for ownership policy 
decision-making and ultimately improves the outcomes of government ownership policy and steering. 
Transparency and published motives for ownership policies are important to keep a broad range of 
stakeholders aligned on the objectives and achievements of ownership policy. 
 
After the introductory section, this article proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present a theoretical 
framework, and we review the institutional settings in section 3. In section 4, we address the basis for 
ownership steering and the classification of state-owned enterprises for surveillance, which are then 




              Theoretical Framework 
 
The Three-Stage Agency Model 
The theoretical framework of this study is based on agency theory, which describes the relationship 
between two or more parties in which one party, designated as the principal, engages another party, 
designated as the agent, to perform some tasks on behalf of the principal (Coase, 1937; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is concerned with analysing and resolving prob-
lems that may occur in the agency-principal relationship. The theory assumes that once principals 
delegate authority to agents, they often have problems controlling them because the agents’ goals 
often differ from theirs, and agents often have better information about their capacity and activities 
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than principals. Agency theory focuses on the measures principals utilise to mitigate this problem by 
selecting certain types of agents and certain forms of monitoring their  actions as well  as by using 
economic incentives (Kiser, 1999). 
 
In the present study, the agency theory setup is three-staged; this frame of reference is presented in 
Figure 1. The first stage in the agency relationship is between the management and owners of indi-
vidual SOEs; the second is between a political decision-making body and the central administration 
responsible for implementing owner steering; and the third is between the political decision-maker 
and the electorate (Huber, 2000; Muller, 2000). This multiple-stage reporting relationship is typical 
for owner steering, particularly in Nordic countries but also in some other OECD countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands (OECD, 2005a). According to the OECD Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2005a), the ideal model is a govern-
ance structure composed of three distinct layers, each with a distinct role: 1) a state-ownership func-
tion that is  responsible for defining the ownership policy and high-level objectives for SOEs; 2) a 
board that is charged by the state with overseeing the development and progress of the chosen strategy 
to achieve the state’s objectives; and 3) an executive-management SOE that proposes a strategy and 
that is then accountable to the board for implementing the strategic plan. 
 
The most important focus of the study is on the second principal-agent relationship, shown in the 
central panel of Figure 1 between the political decision-making body and the central administration 
responsible for implementing ownership steering. In this principal-agent relationship, state admin-
istration (the possible ownership steering unit and the relevant ministries) is now in the role of agent 
and the principal is the political decision-making body, which in the case of Finland is the Parliament 
and its Audit Committee. The third principal-agent relationship portrays how the political decision-
maker is responsible to its own principal, the electorate. This relation is ultimately expressed in the 
parliamentary elections. 
 
Direct and Indirect Ownership Steering 
In Figure 1, the left-hand panel presents the first tier of the principal-agent relationship manifested 
between the management and owners of individual companies. More specifically, the left-hand panel 
shows that state ownership steering can be either direct or indirect. In direct steering, the individual 
SOEs (agents) are obligated to report not only to the officials of the state’s central government (prin-
cipal I) representing the state-owner but also to other owners (principal II). Fundamentally, this agent 
relationship reflects the problems caused by the differentiation of the roles of corporate management, 
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the agent and the owner (the principal) (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
On the other hand, the ownership steering is indirect if the state does not directly own the shares but 
rather indirectly owns them through a holding company, which then owns shares in other companies 
(Liu & Sun, 2005).1 One reason for establishing a holding company is that it is a fast decision-maker; 
therefore, it can exploit the stock markets better than a government when a suitable opportunity opens 
for selling (or buying) shares. The individual SOEs are responsible for reporting to the holding com-
pany, but the holding company itself is required to report its operations to the state government. Thus, 
the state holding company is at the first stage of the agent relationship in both the agent’s and the 
principal’s roles. This also complicates the principal-agency relations and, ultimately, owner steering. 
 
Principal-agency Problems 
Conflicting objectives, political interference and a lack of public transparency are considered the main 
problems for SOEs. A crucial problem for the entire principal-agency chain is a situation in which 
the principal, i.e. the state, has no consistent and transparent ownership policy with identifiable ob-
jectives. The goals of public enterprises may be difficult to specify due to the problems of multiple 
objectives (commercial versus non-commercial) as well as plural principals and agents (Jones, 1991, 
p. 181).  Many levels of principal-agent relationships and accountability chains easily result in ten-
sions and conflicts. The state government is not one entity but rather consists of different administra-
tive levels, ministries and units that may have different perceptions of what the goals should be or 
what the goals mean for practical implementation.  The problem of common agency occurs when each 
relevant part of the government has somewhat different objectives and each tries to influence the 
SOEs accordingly. Managing multiple, and potentially conflicting, objectives is one of the central 
challenges in the governance of SOEs (The World Bank, 2006, p. 3-4). 
 
Agency problems emerge when politicians and bureaucrats as agents tend to harness their private or 
narrow group interests and do not carry out their work in accordance with the interests of society as 
the ultimate principal. For instance, politicians may force companies to perform unprofitable activi-
ties in their electoral district in order for the politician to be re-elected in the next election (Kamal, 
                                                             
1 In Finland, for example, the state completely owns a holding company Solidium, which then owns further shares of 
listed companies.  
 6 
 
2010, p. 214). On the other hand, SOEs’ management may challenge the legacy of their nonfinancial 
obligations set by politicians—for example, by supporting unrelated industries through indirect sub-
sidies such as products, services or financing offered at below-market rates (Budiman et al., 2009).  
 
The government should not overly interfere in SOEs’ decision-making. The OECD and the World 
Bank have stated that, as a best practice, SOE boards should be shielded from political ad-hoc inter-
ventions once their objectives have been defined. The perception that the operation and control of 
SOEs can be influenced by changing political climates can make them less attractive to other investors 
than the state owner (Frederick, 2011; Latin American Development Bank, 2012).  
 
One solution to alleviate public principal-agency problems is total privatisation, which detaches the 
government from the ownership role but, on the other hand, preserves the role of the government as 
a regulator of markets and corporations acting on the markets. Another solution is to remain an owner 
but, at the same time, develop an incentive system as the agency theory suggests. A good incentive 
system can steer and motivate managers to manage their enterprises efficiently and act in the interest 
of society as a whole. Jones (1991) uses the concept of a signalling system that has three components. 
The first is a performance evaluation system, in which national goals are translated into enterprise 
objectives and quantified in a performance criterion. The second is a performance information system 
that monitors actual achievements. The third is an incentive system, in which the welfare of managers 
and workers are linked to national welfare by pecuniary or non-pecuniary bonus systems based on 
the achievement of target values. Governments can also make contracts with SOE boards and man-
agements about the performance expected from the SOE in question (Jones, 1991, p. 180; Vagliasindi, 
2008, p. 18-19; The World Bank, 2006, p. 16-17). However, in this paper we concentrate more on the 
government as an owner of enterprises and on the accountability relationship, especially to the polit-
ical body, and less on the incentive and performance management systems of SOEs.   
 
The reporting lines in our model (Figure 1) show the accountability relations from the agents to the 
principals at the same time. Accountability for the performance of SOEs involves a complex chain of 
agents without clearly identifiable, i.e. remote, principals. This chain of agents can include manage-
ment, enterprise management boards and in two-tier enterprise board structures also supervisory 
boards above management boards, ownership steering entities, ministries and governments. Accord-
ing to the OECD, it is a challenge to structure this web of accountabilities in order to ensure efficient 
decisions and good corporate governance (OECD, 2005a, p. 10). Modelling of accountability rela-
tions can be used to identify and mitigate principal-agent conflicts (Luke, 2010, p. 138).  
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As shown in Figure 1, on one hand the administration responsible for owner steering serves as a 
principal under which individual enterprises operate. On the other hand, the state government is 
obliged to report to its own principal about whether owner steering and owner policies have been 
implemented according to the approved political objectives. Thus, it is important that high-quality 
monitoring information is systematically reported not only to relevant state administrations but also 
to Parliament.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 
Figure 2 shows four different dimensions (type of main owner interest, listed or non-listed enterprises, 
organising of steering function and extent of state ownership of shares) for the appropriate design of 
groups of SOEs, including their accountability and steering systems.  Cells in the figure are not di-
vided according to the fourth dimension regarding the organisation of steering in order to keep the 
figure readable. 
 
The emphasis on ownership interest in SOEs affects the performance goals that are set for SOEs. In 
a consistent model of ownership policy,  this should be the first  thing the state does;  after this,  the 
state can determine which ownership structure will facilitate the achievement of defined goals. There 
are three important options in regard to SOE ownership structure: concentrated ownership, in which 
a state owns 100% of the shares; shared ownership with the state as the majority owner; and shared 
ownership with the state as the minority owner. The shares can be made publicly available by listing 
shares in local and international capital markets, which makes widely dispersed ownership possible. 
Furthermore, the enterprise may be non-listed and owned completely by the state or by a combination 
of public and private investors. 
 
There are three main types of organisations of steering functions. The first is the decentralised (sector) 
model, in which SOEs are under the responsibility of several relevant sector ministries. In the dual 
model, the responsibility is shared between the sector ministry and the Finance Ministry or the Treas-
ury. In the centralised model, the ownership function is concentrated in one main ministry or one 
special ownership agency under the government (OECD, 2005b, p. 41-49; Vagliasindi, 2008, p. 9-




The disadvantages of the decentralised model are that it may mix the ownership function with the 
regulatory role in a sector ministry easier than the other models might, and it may lead to more inter-
ferences in SOE operating decisions compared to the other two models (OECD, 2005b, p. 45; 
Vagliasindi, 2008, p. 13-14). A centralised model or a dual model may better separate the functions 
of ownership and regulation as OECD recommends (2005a). The dual model is in use in many de-
veloping countries. In this model, there may be dual responsibility for certain tasks, for example if 
the ministry of finance and the sector ministry in question both nominate representatives for the board 
of directors. The main disadvantage of the dual model is the multi-principal agency problem, espe-
cially in developing countries that have weak governance arrangements (Vagliasindi, 2008, p. 16).  
 
Cells A1, A3–A6, B3–B6 and C5–C6 show how ownership policy steering has been arranged in the 
case country explained in the next section.  The government of Finland has established a holding 
company that is completely owned by the government. The holding company owns shares in listed 
commercial companies, with the government owning less than 50% of the shares.  Listed companies 
that are strategic are owned directly by the Ownership Steering Department (OSD). 
 
OSD is responsible for steering the holding company as well as the commercial companies with stra-
tegic interests. These may be listed (such as Neste Oil and Fortum, which are leading oil and energy 
companies  in  Finland)  or  non-listed.  Enterprises  with  social  and  public  policy  objectives  are  non-
listed and are owned directly, and they are under the steering responsibility of sector ministries. In 
section 5, we elaborate on the classification of SOEs in Finland according to three dimensions: type 
of main owner interest, listed or non-listed enterprises and extent of state ownership of shares. 
 
According to Vagliasindi (2008, p. 11), the main advantage of a holding company solution is that it 
can be used to facilitate nationwide programs for the privatisation and restructuring of state-owned 
industry. The disadvantage is that a holding company doesn’t change the possible poor corporate 
governance in the country. It requires its own specific programs for developing corporate governance 
for SOEs. 
 
The  case  of  Finland  shows that  a  holding  company can  also  be  used  to  buy  shares  of  industrially  
important companies. The Finnish government added its ownership of an existing telecommunication 




In Finland, SOEs with social and public policy objectives (known as special state assignment enter-
prises) are mainly organised under the steering responsibility of the appropriate sector ministry; for 
instance, the Finnish Broadcasting Network company is under the rule of the Ministry of Traffic and 
Media. These enterprises are typically non-listed. 
 
Cells C1,  C3 and C5 show problematic or nonviable solutions for SOEs with important social and 
public policy objectives. These objectives are difficult or impossible to accomplish if the enterprises 
are listed companies and the state is not the only owner. If the enterprise is non-listed and the state 
does not control the enterprise (C5), problems may emerge in fulfilling the special social objectives. 
Cell B1, which shows enterprises with strategic commercial value for government, is even more prob-
lematic because in this cell, the state is only a minority owner and the ownership is indirect through 
a holding company 
 
The three main multi-agency chain alternatives that mediate the ownership policy lines to implemen-
tation in a parliamentary democracy and report to the principal of the ownership policy can be drawn 
as follows. 
 
a) Centralised organisation: State government > ownership agency/coordinating ministry  
(holding company) > SOE > board (in a two-tier system, a supervisory board and a manage-
ment board) > chief executive officer (CEO) 
b) Dual system: State government > ownership agency/coordinating ministry > (holding com-
pany) and sector ministries > SOE > board (or supervisory board and management board) > 
CEO 
c) Decentralised organisation: State government > sector ministries  > SOE > board (or super-
visory board and management board) > CEO 
 
In Parliament, there may be a special audit committee or economy committee that prepares SOE 
matters for plenary sessions. This special committee may have the right to audit SOE matters and 
arrange public or secret hearings of agents responsible in the multi-agency chain. Furthermore, the 
parliament may obtain independent evaluation information from the supreme audit institution in the 
country regarding the implementation of the ownership policy. In the next section, we shed more light 




Institutional Case Environment 
 
The Finnish history of state industrial policy extends back to the first decades after independence in 
1917 (Hyytinen, Kuosa, & Takalo, 2003). During the years before and after the Second World War, 
there was a lack of capital to support important heavy industries, such as the energy, metal, wood, 
and paper industries. Because of this, the state took the initiative and established state-owned com-
panies in these fields. This historical background explains the wide array of Finnish state ownership 
in the heavy industries (Moen & Lilja, 2005; Ornston, 2012). 
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the New Public Management (NPM) movement, which aimed to reform 
hierarchically operating public administrations in a more flexible managerial direction and to apply 
market models, had an influence in Finland (Hood, 1996; Temmes, 1998: Green-Peders, 2002). The 
NPM trend in the Finnish public sector caused the transfer of business-like operations from the state 
budget into off-budget entities and further into state-owned corporations. However, the systematic 
state ownership policy as a separate policy field in the platform of the Finnish government did not 
begin until the 2000s (Vuoria, 2004). The first separate and explicit ownership policy and corporate 
governance government resolution were formulated in 2003. Today, the state ownership policy and 
corporate governance are delineated in each government program and in each government resolution 
pertaining to state ownership policy. The latest government resolution on state ownership policy was 
adopted in 2011. 
 
The current Finnish SOE policy is based on the international principles for state ownership recom-
mended by the OECD (2005a). Among the main principles of the recommendations are 1) that the 
finances of the enterprise and the finances of the state be kept separately, and 2) that the state should 
maintain clear separation of responsibilities among the bodies of the companies and operate only as 
the owner. Thus, the state-owner executes its owner rights in owners’ general meetings and has an 
evaluative and monitoring role with regards to SOE operations, and it does not intervene in opera-
tional business decision-making. The ownership steering function is mainly centralised in Finland as 
OECD recommends, although there are some traits of a dual system because sector ministries have 
certain substantial steering functions for special state assignment enterprises. 
 
The basic law that the ownership steering must follow is the State Shareholdings and Ownership 
Steering Act (1368/2007). According to that act, state ownership steering refers to the exercising of 
the  state’s  right  to  vote  in  general  meetings  as  well  as  to  other  measures  by  which  the  state  as  a  
 11 
 
shareholder contributes to companies’ administration and operating principles. Thus, the concept of 
‘state ownership steering’ refers to various actions by which the governmental authorities as an owner 
may influence the companies. Duties relating to state ownership steering are handled in the sector 
ministries and the coordinating Ownership Steering Department located within the Prime Minister’s 
Office. Finnish SOE policy has been based on the corporatisation of SOEs in accordance with OECD 
recommendations (2005a). Corporatisation means that companies must follow general company law. 
Therefore, the government of Finland cannot directly nominate or dismiss board members or CEOs 
because these actions belong to the owners in the general meeting or to the board of the company. 
Special assignment companies must follow a separate law that has been enacted especially for the 
company, such as for the Finnish broadcast company. These separate laws or articles of incorporation 
define what the special assignment is and, therefore, the trade-off factors with commercial goals for 
those companies. 
 
The owner steering function of the state of Finland is in accordance with the executive power and 
division of tasks in the legislation on the Finnish Companies Act (624/2006), which is most closely 
related to the corresponding laws in other Nordic countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway 
(Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006; Kankaanpää, 2009). Moreover, in relation to the publicly listed SOEs, 
the regulatory body of Finnish corporate governance also includes the Securities Market Act, the 
Rules of the NASDAQ Helsinki Stock Exchange and the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority 
governed by the Bank of Finland (Securities Market Association 2010).  
                        
 
 
Classification Basis for State-Owned Enterprises 
 
In the SOE literature, the basic demarcation line has been drawn between enterprises with commercial 
goals and those that also have non-commercial goals. For instance, in Indonesia, there are two types 
of SOEs: general companies that have social purposes and limited liability companies that are busi-
ness-oriented SOEs (Kamal, 2010). In Finland, SOEs have been classified in three categories: com-
mercial enterprises, commercial enterprises with strategic value and special state assignment enter-
prises with societal goals. In some Latin American countries, SOEs have been classified in four cat-
egories: SOEs created for the purpose of achieving public policy objectives; SOEs responsible for 
providing public utilities and services (e.g. water, electricity, gas, etc.); SOEs that exclusively provide 
goods or services required by the state (e.g. military suppliers); and SOEs responsible for producing 
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revenue for the state that compete with the private sector under equal conditions (Latin American 
Development Bank, 2012, p. 20-21).  
 
In this paper, we use a basic classification in which SOEs are divided according to the type of owner’s 
interest: non-commercial enterprises (special state assignment enterprises), commercial enterprises 
with pure commercial shareholder interest and commercial enterprises with strategic value for the 
government. A division into two classes is too crude, and the above-mentioned division into four 
classes unnecessarily mixes the type of owner’s interest with the type of produced goods. 
 
Division According to Basis of Ownership 
Through public ownership, the state can sustain sectors of long-term strategic or national security 
interests that are presently uneconomical for private investment (Luke, 2010). In addition, govern-
ments often find SOEs to be a useful strategy for pursuing social goals, such as greater equality and 
social stability (Ramamurti, 1987; Bozec & Breton, 2003; Austvik, 2012). In Finland, the owner in-
terests of the state of Finland fall into three groups: economic, strategic and special state assignment 
(Finnish Council of State, 2007, 2011). 
 
The tasks of special state assignment enterprises are  generally  provided  for  in  the  legislations  of  
various countries, and they determine the state ownership policy and how state steering is carried out 
(Luke, 2010). In special state assignments, the objectives of state ownership are primarily societal, 
albeit with the general aim that the operations should be cost-effective (Finnish Council of State, 
2007, 2011). The sector ministries in charge are responsible for steering special state assignment 
enterprises. 
 
In Finland the corporate charter is a crucial tool in state ownership steering of special state assignment 
companies. In the corporate charter, the state defines the societal goals as well as the social and envi-
ronmental responsibilities that the company must advance; it must comply with these goals even if 
they are in conflict with business or economic goals. However, the business strategy of a special state 
assignment company must not jeopardise the societal goals laid down by management and adminis-
trative bodies (OECD, 2005a).  
 
Enterprises with economic and strategic interests (commercial companies) operate under market con-
ditions. Market conditions are the operating principles, funding structure and target proceeds in en-
terprises owned by the state that can be compared with other enterprises operating in the same fields; 
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the aim is to achieve an optimal economic profit (Vuoria, 2004). The responsibility for ownership 
steering companies operating under market conditions lies primarily with the Prime Minister’s Office 
and the OSD.    
 
However, in Finland, the fact that SOEs with economic and strategic interests are a very heterogene-
ous group is problematic (Parliament of Finland, 1/2009, 5/2010, 11/2010). Some SOEs operating 
under market conditions are also linked to the state’s strategic interests, such as objectives connected 
to maintaining and ensuring infrastructure or to basic services, but some of them are involved in 
purely market-based business. Moreover, some SOEs with economic and strategic interests are pub-
licly listed, but some are not. Thus, it appears that the category ‘enterprises with economic and stra-
tegic interests’ is too general, especially for parliamentary monitoring purposes.   
 
Division According to the Extent of Ownership 
State ownership shares vary from full 100% ownership to less-than-10% minority ownership (Liu & 
Sun, 2005; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). State majority-owned companies are those in which the state holds 
more than 50% but less than 100% of the votes. If the state owns 100% of the share capital, this is a 
‘company with sole state ownership’. Then the sole owner, the state, is free to set objectives (other 
than economic ones) without endangering the positions of other owners or infringing on their rights. 
In Finland, a ‘state associated company’ refers to an enterprise in which the state holds at least 10%, 
but not more than 50%, of all the voting shares. It is important to note that the advent of a single 
minority shareholder changes the nature of the company, especially in the operations of publicly listed 
SOEs because then enterprises are obligated to ensure equal treatment of all shareholders in all their 
actions (Liu & Sun, 2005).  
 
Division According to Stock Exchange Listing 
Decisive steps regarding market direction and market conditions (excluding the owner’s non-market 
modes of operation or demands) are taken when the enterprise is listed on the Stock Exchange 
(OECD, 2005a; Goldeng, Grünfeld, & Benito, 2008). Special assignments of social services are ex-
cluded in publicly listed companies in the Stock Exchange, unless these assignments are accepted by 
the investors and owners in the markets. 
 
At the beginning of May 2013, the Finnish state was a majority owner in three strategically important 
listed companies (see Appendix 1 and Category IV B). In addition, the state has a considerable mi-
nority shareholding in 11 associated companies (Appendix 1, Category V C). The ownership steering 
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of listed companies is accomplished through the Prime Minister’s Office in such a way that compa-
nies with a majority of shares owned by the state are in direct relation to the state steering unit of the 
Prime Minister’s Office. On the other hand, for companies in which a minority of shares are state-
owned, steering is indirect because steering is centralised to the holding company Solidium. Solidium 
itself is a 100% state-owned special state assignment company that falls within the steering responsi-
bility of the Prime Minister’s Office VNK (compare to Figure 1).  
 
Social Service Assignment and Shareholder Value Interest 
As noted in the previous section, the state can sustain sectors of long-term strategic interests such as 
national security through public ownership, but the state may also be motivated by purely financial 
objectives. Based on the division according to the basis of ownership, we divided ownership steering 
purposes regarding SOEs into the social service assignment principle and the shareholder value cre-
ation principle. 
 
The social service assignment principle refers to how effectively the company promotes its social 
goals and fulfils its special service assignment set by Parliament and the ministries or the Prime Min-
ister’s Office. The shareholder value creation principle refers to how profitable and competitive the 
company is in relation to its competitors in the same industry, i.e. how effectively it creates share-
holder value. Some companies in the state portfolio are more oriented toward social service assign-




Classification of Finnish SOEs for Steering and Reporting 
 
The two-class SOE classification system according to basis of ownership (‘special state assignment’ 
and ‘enterprises with economic and strategic interests’) by the Finnish Council of State is too general 
for parliamentary monitoring purposes. A system is needed that further clarifies the nature of state 
ownership (Parliament of Finland, 1/2009). While some SOEs with economic and strategic interests 
are also linked to the state’s strategic interests, others are involved in purely market-based business. 
In addition, some SOEs with economic and strategic interests are publicly listed, but some are not.  
 
Based on different ownerships and Stock Exchange listing statuses, we grouped Finnish SOEs into 




I. Special state assignment companies; 
II. Unlisted companies operating under market conditions in which the state also has a stra-
tegic interest; 
III. Unlisted companies operating under market conditions in which the state has a pure share-
holder interest; 
IV. Stock-Exchange-listed companies with the state as the majority shareholder in which the 
state has a strategic interest; and 
V. Stock-Exchange-listed companies in which the state is an associate shareholder. 
 
We also divided the companies in each of the five categories (I–V) into three sub-categories (A, B 
and C) according to the extent of state ownership. The three sub-categories are as follows: 
 
A. Companies with sole state ownership (100% of the votes); 
B. State-majority-owned companies (more than 50%, but less than 100%, of the votes); and 
C. State-associated companies (more than 10%, but less than 50%, of the votes).  
 
In Figure 3, the state’s ownership of companies is grouped into five categories (I–V) according to 
how much the state as an owner is focused on the social service assignment principle (the white area 
in Figure 2) or purely shareholder value interests (the grey area in Figure 3). The greater the share of 
the white column (and the smaller the grey one), the more state ownership steering of SOEs is focused 
on the social service assignment. Similarly, the greater the share of the grey column (and the smaller 
the white one), the more SOEs are focused on creating shareholder value. This system also provides 
a basis for structuring an information and communication system in which the goals are defined and 
performance is discussed and modified between the principals and agents. 
 
The five categories (I–V) and three sub-groups (A, B and C) of individual SOEs in the Finnish state 
portfolio are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
 





On the left of Figure 3, category I A includes the 100% state-owned special state assignment compa-
nies. The state-ownership steering in these companies is strongly oriented toward social service as-
signment (thus the white area is long), although the general goal of profitable operations applies as 
well  (as  shown by  the  short  grey  area).  On the  other  hand,  category  V C on  the  right  of  Figure  2  
displays listed companies in which the state is a minority shareholder and has pure shareholder value 
interests without social service assignment. Thus, category V C is completely grey.  
 
It is important to note that the advent of a single minority shareholder (sub-groups B and C) changes 
the nature of the company. Then, the decision-making of the company and the ownership steering 
must be arranged with due respect for equal treatment of shareholders. This restriction has been ren-
dered in the figure with a spotted area, and it appears in all SOE categories in which there are other 
owners  in  addition  to  the  state  (i.e.  categories  I  B&C,  II  B&C,  III  B&C and IV B).  In  the  Stock-
Exchange-listed state-associated companies in category V, the state-owner has a pure shareholder 
value interest. Therefore, the state ownership interests do not diverge in any form from the objectives 
of achieving profits according to the Finnish Companies Act (624/2006). 
 
Figures 2 and 3 are analytical tools used to design and evaluate solutions for arranging the state own-
ership policy. The government of Finland has some SOEs (Appendix 1) in sub-groups I C and II C, 
which is problematic if the social and strategic goals that the government has set for those enterprises 
are endangered because of the decision-making power of the majority of owners. In category IV B, 
the Finnish government has decided to keep the majority of shares because of the strategic interests. 
For this reason, we have no sub-group C in this class. If the government of Finland wished to sell its 
shares of these listed strategic companies below the line of having the majority of votes, they would 
require Parliament’s permission. 
 
The novelty of our model is not only the more subtle classification tool created but also that the 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1979; Eisenhardt 1989) used in conjunction with our model cre-
ates a template for testing hypotheses with further research. For instance, in line with Vagliasindi 
(2008), we anticipate that the longer the principal-agency chain (i.e. the more levels in the chain), the 
more the chain will contain dual and parallel roles for principals and agents. In addition, the more the 
principal is politically disharmonious, the higher the probability of biased, contradictory, delayed 
and/or misinterpreted steering signalling from principals to the ultimate agents (SOEs). If the princi-
pal, i.e. the ruling cabinet in the country, cannot politically agree on the ownership policy content and 
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is unable to consistently classify SOEs according to their ownership interests and goals, the probabil-
ity of inconsistent steering signalling will be very high. This is related to the problem of common 
agency (see the theoretical framework, p. 5-6.)  
 
One tentative example is the case of the icebreaking company Arctic Shipping Ltd., which is fully 
owned by the Finnish government and is under the steering competence of ODS. It is a commercial 
company with a strategic value (category II in Figure 3) because of the importance of keeping ship-
ping routes open in the Baltic Sea during the winter. During the summer, the multipurpose icebreakers 
are hired in the offshore oil and gas fields, most recently for the Shell Company’s oil-drilling activities 
in Arctic waters. This business is exercised by the subsidiary Arctia Offshore Ltd., which is fully 
owned by the parent company Arctia Shipping Ltd. The steering chain is very long and contains dual 
and partially parallel principals and agents. After the 2011 parliamentary elections, an internally dis-
connected, multiparty Cabinet came into power, led by Prime Minister Katainen. Therefore, it is 
likely that conflicts will occur in the chain.  
 
In 2013, these conflicts became apparent. Arctia and the minister for state ownership steering, the 
Green League’s Heidi Hautala, were at the centre of a scandal that emerged when the minister indi-
rectly intervened to protect Greenpeace activists who boarded Arctia vessels in protest of the Shell 
deal. The OSD’s interference with the Arctia Offshore Ltd.’s decision-making, along with the minis-
ter’s contribution, was considered by the media and the most powerful Cabinet party (the moderate-
right party Kokoomus) to be inappropriate. Hautala resigned from her post on October 11, 2013. 
During the conflict, different interpretations were expressed on whether it was appropriate for the 
fully state-owned icebreaking company with a strategic interest in Baltic Sea to form a leasing busi-
ness via its subsidiary company with Shell Oil in Arctic waters. Some criticised this as against gov-
ernment environmental policy because of the heavy risks involved in drilling oil in Arctic waters, 
while others argued that the Finnish special expertise regarding icebreaking and offshore services 
should be utilised commercially.  
 
Arctic Shipping, which has a monopoly in the Finnish market, charges higher fees than comparable 
Swedish  companies.  This  raised  suspicions  in  the  Transport  Ministry  that  earnings  from  ordinary  
operations were supporting riskier offshore ventures during the summer months.  The risk comes from 
any spills that might occur. If Arctia has to pay to clean up oil spills, its own assets are on the line; 
however, a report by the Research Institute for the Finnish Economy (ETLA) in 2012 stated that the 
government, as a 100% owner, could also be liable.  In 2010, Arctia was warned by the Transport and 
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Communications Ministry about its risk management policies. The ministry was particularly dissat-
isfied with risk management in Arctia’s offshore agreements (Yle News, 2013.)  
  
To maintain the steering mechanism’s viability, the commercial activity of the offshore business 
could have been separated from the government steering chain by privatising the commercial com-
pany and its risks. In addition, if the strategic icebreaking service as a monopoly is not functioning 
satisfactorily from the principal’s point-of-view, it could be transferred nearer to the principal and its 
representative, the Finnish Transport Agency. It could ultimately be changed from an SOE to a public 
utility under the jurisdiction of the Finnish Transport Agency.        
 
Reporting Priorities for Parliamentary Monitoring Purposes 
Transparency requires simultaneously reporting information to all shareholders in order to ensure 
equitable treatment (OECD, 2005a, pp. 34, 38-39). According to the OECD recommendations, the 
coordinating or ownership entity should ensure that adequate external reporting systems are in place 
for all SOEs (OECD, 2005a, p. 30). Coordinating or centralised ownership entities should develop 
aggregate reporting that covers all SOEs and make the reports a key disclosure tool directed to the 
general public, the Parliament and the media (OECD, 2005a, p. 41) 
 
Non-commercial objectives are particularly troublesome because they are typically difficult to quan-
tify in money terms. It is not easy to measure the achievements of non-commercial objectives and 
incorporate them into the performance evaluation and reporting system. If it is not possible to quantify 
performance, non-commercial outcomes should be evaluated in qualitative terms and entered into the 
system of performance indicators. When the costs are quantifiable, the enterprise in question can be 
compensated by an amount that covers the incremental costs of meeting non-commercial objectives 
(Jones, 1991, pp. 186, 195-205). According to the OECD, when the SOE is also used for public policy 
objectives, such as general services obligations, it should also report on how these are being achieved 
(OECD, 2005a, p. 44). 
 
In this article, we limit detailed technical discussion of the best practices for financial reporting by 
governments and SOEs. Financial reporting for listed and large non-listed SOEs should comply with 
international standards (The World Bank, 2006, p. 20-21). Accounting methods should be based on 
accrual-based accounting, which allows for a full balance sheet showing the full scope of assets and 
liabilities of the government as well of the SOEs. Traditionally, central governments’ financial reports 
have been tied to the budget entities of the government, which might have hidden spending and debts 
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transferred to SOEs and other off-budget entities. Modern accounting principles require companies 
to consolidate accounts for all the entities they control. This principle, when adapted to the public 
sector, means that governments should also provide consolidated financial statements that include 
government-controlled SOEs. At the moment, few governments consolidate SOEs in their financial 
statements (Blondy et al., 2013, p. 267-2719).  SOEs should also report non-financial information, 
including related party transactions (especially with other SOEs), changes in board membership and 
high-level executives and changes in ownership structure. Performance indicators related to SOE 
objectives could also be reported to the public as well as information regarding commercial and non-
commercial policy objectives, estimates of the latter’s cost and financial assistance from the state 
(The World Bank, 2006, p. 20-21). SOEs should also have a heightened sensitivity to corporate social 
responsibility reporting (Frederic, 2011, p. 22). 
 
The SOE classification in Figure 3 systematises the information needed for parliamentary monitoring. 
The more the SOEs are situated toward the left in Figure 2, the more the state as an owner has interests 
other than pure shareholder value and the more Parliament requires surveillance information on how 
well the company fulfils its social service assignment. The focus for special state assignment compa-
nies (the companies in category I) is on the steering perspective set by the ministry in charge. The 
general goal is that operations are profitable, but the monitoring information stresses quantifying and 
assessing the companies’ social service assignments.  
 
The focus in category II-V SOEs is primarily on economic principles, and strategic interests should 
be reconciled with these. The aim is that the companies’ profitability and financial structures should 
be at least as good as those of domestic and international competitors. Regarding profitability, good 
parameters are, among others, the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) describing the structure 
of the result, the return on equity (ROE), and the return on assets (ROA). For the analysis of financial 
structure, the appropriate measures include debt-to-equity and gearing (see e.g. Revsine et al., 2005; 
Stolowy & Lebas, 2006). In the Stock-Exchange-listed SOEs in categories IV and V, the analysis can 
be supplemented with figures based on market information. Among others, the main information to 
be reported is the development of market value and its relation to the general development of the 
shares, the yield of the portfolio in relation to the average market yield and the amount of dividends 
received by the state (Shareholder Executive, 2009).   
 
If the solution is not to have only one aggregate performance report for the parliament containing 
performance information from all SOEs, an alternative solution is to have one report on commercial 
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SOEs prepared by the coordinating ownership agency and separate reports prepared by sector minis-
tries responsible for special state assignment enterprises with social and public policy goals for the 
parliament. The important factor here is that the principal, i.e. the parliament, can receive complete 
information on how the ownership policy steering and implementation has been performed. Reporting 
should cover all categories of SOEs if performance reporting and monitoring is to be consistent and 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study aimed to create a basis for a general model that is able to systematically categorise state 
ownership policy and steering. The theoretical concepts were derived from the agency theory, and 
the practical concept of steering was then inserted into the theoretical model in a way that serves state 
ownership policy and steering of SOEs (Figure 1).  In Figure 2, we showed four different dimensions 
(type of main owner interest, listed or non-listed enterprises, concentration of steering function and 
extent of state ownership of shares) connected to methods for appropriately organising groups of 
SOEs, their accountability and steering system. We outlined three main multi-agency chains that, in 
a parliamentary democracy, mediate the ownership policy lines to implementation by the accountable 
agents. 
 
In Figure 3, we constructed a model that appropriately categorises the state ownership policy of state-
owned companies for accountability and steering purposes. Based on the heterogeneous field of the 
Finnish state’s share portfolio, we used the model to classify SOEs in the case country Finland. First, 
we classified SOEs according to the basis of ownership,  extent of ownership and Stock Exchange 
listing status. Second, we divided the objectives for SOE ownership steering into two main principles: 
the social service assignment principle and the shareholder value creation principle. Third, on the 
basis of ownership, extent of ownership, and listing status, we grouped the SOEs into different cate-
gories according to the extent to which the state as an owner is focused on the social service assign-
ment principle or purely on shareholder value interests. This SOE classification systematises the in-
formation needed for parliamentary monitoring. Consistency in ownership goals, steering and report-
ing creates good preconditions for consistent reporting for ownership policy decision-making and 
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ultimately improves the outcomes of ownership policy and steering. Reporting should cover all cate-
gories of SOEs if performance reporting and monitoring is to be consistent and comprehensive for 
parliamentary surveillance purposes. 
 
We need a consistent model for designing and monitoring the implementation of ownership policy 
not only for parliamentary surveillance purposes but also because the government is accountable for 
the general public, voters and taxpayers.  Each government should publish, either online or via other 
accessible media, its ownership policy lines and how it categorises its SOEs into the different classes 
outlined in this paper.   
 
The theoretical contribution of the paper is that it elaborates on the most commonly used simple 
division of SOEs to commercial  and non-commercial  enterprises.  The novelty of this study comes 
from our creation of a model that is based on the agency theoretical basis and includes different 
ownership policy dimensions and principal-agent steering chain characteristics. This paper also has 
several practical contributions. The three-dimensional division of SOEs, together with the dimension 
of how to organise the steering function, creates a consistent and systematic basis for a monitoring 
and reporting system.  The model or framework in this paper may show problematic solutions in 
ownership policy and steering and lead to reconsideration of the appropriateness of the present system 
in the country.  The detailed classification suggested in the paper may reveal that the extent of state 
ownership in some categories of SOEs is not justified or that,  in some cases,  the state should own 
more shares or possibly all shares of the SOEs in question. Furthermore, we show that the state should 
withdraw from ownership in some cases. 
 
The research findings obtained within the context of the state of Finland and its Parliament are also 
applicable globally as they form an outline of salient issues in the pursuit of good governance, ad-
ministration and parliamentary monitoring in ownership steering. The findings are interesting, espe-
cially in the context of developing countries in Asia, South-America and Africa as well as for transi-
tion economies in some Eastern European countries. In these countries, the dimensions of owner 
steering may be in need of development and the variety of their SOEs is significant.  
 
One limitation of the study is that we theorised a framework (model) that was tested with only one 
case country, even though it was a good fit for the testing purposes. Another limitation is related to 
the outline of this paper. We used the model mainly for classification purposes, even though the model 
and its bases (agency theory) create possibilities for testing assumptions connected to the principal-
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agency chain characteristics (causes) and ownership policy and steering outcomes (effects). The prin-
cipal-agency characteristics may contain variables such as the length and levels of steering chains; 
the occurrence of parallel and dual principal and agent roles; and the variety of SOEs and steering 
purposes. The effects (outcomes) may consist of conflicts of interest in steering, noncompliance with 
rules of steering and conduct of SOEs, inefficiency in SOEs’ performance, agency costs and asym-
metric information serving SOEs’ self-interests. These and other formulated assumptions and hypoth-
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Appendix 1. Finnish State Shareholding on May 2, 20132  
     
Category I: Unlisted special assignment companies   
     
A State as a sole proprietor State Shareholding Ownership Steering 
  Alko Oy 100.0% STM 
  Arsenal Ltd 100.0% VM 
  CSC Scientific Computing Ltd  100.0% OKM 
  Finavia Corporation 100.0% LVM 
  Finnish Industry Investment Ltd 100.0% TEM 
  Finnpilot Pilotage Ltd 100.0% LVM 
  Finnvera Oyj 100.0% TEM 
  Governia Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Hansel Ltd 100.0% VM 
  Haus Kehittämiskeskus Oy  100.0% VM 
  Solidium Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Suomen Erillisverkot Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Veikkaus. Oy 100.0% OKM 
  Yleisradio Oy 100.0% LVM 
     
B State majority-owned companies   
  Finnfund Ltd 90.4% UM 
  Tietokarhu 80.0% VM 
  Yrityspankki Skop Oyj 95.2% VM 
     
C State associated companies   
  Aalto University Properties Ltd 33.3% VM 
  Finnish Aviation Academy Ltd  49.5% OKM 
  Helsingin yliopistokiinteistöt Oy 33.3% VM 
  Horse Institute Ltd 25.0% OKM 
  Suomen yliopistokiinteistöt Oy 33.3% VM 
     
 
Category II: Unlisted companies in which the state also has a strategic interest 
     
A State as a sole proprietor State Shareholding Ownership Steering 
  Actia Shipping Ltd  100.0% VNK 
  Itella Corporation 100.0% VNK 
  Leijona Catering Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Meritaito Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Motiva Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Suomen Lauttaliikenne Oy 100.0% VNK 
  Mint of Finland Ltd 100.0% VNK 
  SuomenViljava Oy 100.0% VNK 
  VR-Group Ltd 100.0% VNK 
     
B State majority-owned companies   
  Boreal Plant Breeding Ltd 60.8% VNK 
  Fingrid Oyj 53.1% VNK 
  Patria Plc 73.2% VNK 
  Vapo Oy 50.1% VNK 
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C State associated companies   
  Ekokem Oy 34.1% VNK 
  Gasum Corporation 24.0% VNK 
  Municipality Finance  16.0% YM 
 
 
Category III: Unlisted companies in which the state has a pure shareholder interest 
     
A State as a sole proprietor State Shareholding Ownership Steering 
  Altia Plc 100.0% VNK 
  Destia Ltd 100.0% VNK 
  Edita Plc 100.0% VNK 
     
B State majority-owned companies   
  Raskone Ltd 85.0% VNK 
  Kemijoki Oy 50.1% VNK 
     
C State associated companies   
  Art and Design City Helsinki Oy Ab 35.2% VNK 
  Finnish Seed Potato Centre Ltd 22.0% VNK 
  
 
   
Category IV B: Listed companies with the state as a majority shareholder 
     
   State Shareholding Ownership Steering 
  Finnair Plc 55.8% VNK 
  Fortum Corporation 50.8% VNK 
  Neste Oil Corporation 50.1% VNK 
     
Category V C: Listed companies with the state as an associate shareholder 
     
   State Shareholding Ownership Steering 
  Elisa Corporation 10.1% VNK Solidium 
  Kemira Oyj 16.7% VNK Solidium 
  Metso Corporation 11.1% VNK Solidium 
  Outokumpu Oyj 21.8% VNK Solidium 
  Outoteck Oyj 10.0% VNK Solidium 
  Rautaruukki Corporation 39.7% VNK Solidium 
  Sampo Plc 14.2% VNK Solidium 
  Stora Enso Oyj  12.3% VNK Solidium 
  Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 16.7% VNK Solidium 
  TeliaSonera AB 11.7% VNK Solidium 
  Tieto Corporation 10.3% VNK Solidium 
  
 
   
  Abbreviations:   
  LVM = Ministry of Transport and Communications  
  OKM = Ministry of Education and Culture   
  STM = Ministry of Social Affairs and Health   
  TEM = Ministry of Employment and the Economy  
  UM = Ministry for Foreign Affairs   
  VM = Ministry of Finance   
  VNK = Ownership Steering Department in the Prime Minister’s Office  
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Figure 3. The SOE Classification for Steering and Parliamentary Monitoring Purposes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
